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Abstract
The dense deployment of small cells in indoor and outdoor areas contributes
mainly in increasing the capacity of cellular networks. On the other hand, the high
number of deployed base stations coupled with the increasing growth of data traffic
have prompted the apparition of base stations fitted with storage capacity to avoid
network saturation. The storage devices are used as caching units to overcome the
limited backhaul capacity in small cells networks (SCNs). Extending the concept of
storage to SCNs, gives rise to many new challenges related to the specific characteris-
tics of these networks such as the heterogeneity of the base stations. Formulating the
caching problem while taking into account all these specific characteristics with the
aim to satisfy the users expectations result in combinatorial optimization problems.
However, classical optimization tools do not ensure the optimality of the provided
solutions or often the proposed algorithms have an exponential complexity.
While most of the existing works are based on the classical optimization tools,
in this thesis, we explore another approache to provide a practical solution for the
caching problem. In particular, we focus on matching theory which is a game the-
oretic approach that provides mathematical tools to formulate, analyze and un-
derstand scenarios between sets of players. We model the caching problem as a
one-to-one matching game between a set of files and a set of base stations and then,
we propose an iterative extension of the deferred acceptance algorithm that finds a
stable and optimal matching between the two sets. The experimental results show
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During the last decade, mobile data traffic has grown exponentially, and is expected
to continue increasing from 1.3 Exabytes per month by 2012 up to 10.8 Exabytes per
month by 2016 [1]. Meanwhile, conventional wireless networks have already reached their
capacity limits, especially during peak hours. Moreover, most of the existing solutions
aiming to increase the data throughput through using more spectrum and improving
spectral efficiency are not sufficient to keep up with traffic demand growth [3]. In order to
increase the conventional network capacity and improve the users’ Quality of Experience
(QoE), the concept of small cell networks (SCNs) has recently emerged as a promising
solution [2].
The SCNs’ concept revolves around the very dense deployment of low-cost and low-
power small base stations (SBSs) which provide a cost-effective way to boost the wireless
capacity and oﬄoad traffic from the main macro-cellular networks. However, despite
the advantages of the SCNs, the SBSs are connected to the network through a capacity-
limited and possibly heterogeneous backhaul links which can reduce the potential gains
of SCN deployments. To deal with the backhaul bottleneck, distributed caching in SCNs
is considered as a promising solution [6], [7]. The basic idea of distributed caching is to
duplicate and store the data in SBSs so as to serve users’ requests locally, from the closest
SBSs without using the backhaul links, whenever possible. However, storing data at the
SCNs’ level introduce several new challenges such as: which files should be cached, how
files should be stored among the SBSs, what is the optimal caching strategy that would
reduce the load of backhaul links and meet the users’ requirements, among others. In
most of the works that address the caching problem, the authors formulate the problem as
combinatorial optimization problems, and then propose algorithms based on heuristics
as solutions. These algorithms do not ensure the optimality of the solutions or often
have exponential complexity. In this thesis, instead of using the classical optimization
theory to answer to the addressed questions, we explore other approaches that provide
practical solution for such problems. In particular, we focus on matching theory which
is a game theoretic approach that provides mathematical tools to formulate, analyze,
and understand scenarios between sets of players.
Matching games were firstly introduced to solve economics’ problems such as the
well-known marriage problem [12]. This problem consists of finding a matching between
a set of men and a set of women while taking into account the preferences of each person
over the set of the opposite sex. In our model, we consider two sets of players: a set M
of SBSs and a set C of content provider servers (CPSs) that acts on behalf of a library
of files. We aim using matching games to find an assignment of the files stored at the
CPSs to the SBSs according to the popularity of files at each SBS as well as the users’
expectation in terms of delivery time.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we provide a
general introduction to SCNs and we discuss their limitations and challenges. The
existing distributed caching techniques for SCNs are also presented in this chapter.
Chapter 3 provides an introduction to matching theory. We first present the main
3
results in literature for each of the three classes of matching games: one-to-one, many-
to-one and many-to-many matchings. Then, we provide an overview on three other
matching classes: canonical matching, matching with externalities, and matching with
dynamics. In Chapter 4, we model the storage problem in SCNs as a matching game
and we propose an algorithm that aims to reduce the backhaul load. We also study
its characteristics in this section. In Chapter 5, we evaluate the performances of the
proposed algorithm compared to a baseline algorithm. Finally, we conclude in Chapter
6 with a brief summary and perspectives concerning the extensions of this work.
2 A general Overview on Small Cell Networks
2.1 Introduction
Recently, the wireless traffic has grown exponentially due to the proliferation of smart-
phones and tablets. Most of the traffic load is generated by multimedia content that
require a high Quality of Service (QoS). Consequently, novel approaches for modeling,
analyzing, and designing wireless networks are needed in order to maintain tolerable
delays and efficiently exploit the scarce radio resources. Indeed, conventional networks
have already met their capacity limits since the performance of the previously used so-
lutions to enhance the networks capacity, meet with the ergodic capacity limit [3]. To
overcome this issue and maintain seamless, high QoS wireless connectivity, SBSs were
integrated to the conventional wireless networks resulting in the concept of small cell
networks.
SCNs can be seen as a promising solution to increase network capacity with low
energy consumption. In these networks, the integrated SBSs carry all the data traffic,
while the typical macro base stations ensure the area coverage. Despite the advantages
of the SCNs, they have an important issue since SBSs are expected to connect to the
core network via a capacity-limited backhaul links. Indeed, the solution of using fiber-
optic to connect the SBSs to the network is expensive. To deal with these backhaul-level
limitations and reduce the associated congestion problems in the network, the distributed
storage (distributed caching) over SBSs in SCNs is a new promising solution proposed
in [6], [7]. Nevertheless, several metrics should be considered in the proposed distributed
caching approaches. These metrics are related to both the specific characteristics of the
networks and users’ requirements. In particular, the most accessed data by users ( users’
preferences) and the mobility patterns of users need to be considered to define efficient
caching strategies.
In this chapter, we first give a general introduction to the concept of SCNs as well as
to the benefits from their deployment. Then, we discuss the main challenges that face
the deployment and development of small cells. Furthermore, we address the problem of
distributed storage in SCNs and we present the works investigating distributed storage
solutions in SCNs.
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2.2 Definitions and Generalities
In this section we define the concept of SCNs and we discuss their limits.
• Small cells: This term includes all low-powered radio access base stations that
operate in a range spectrum of 10 meters to several hundred meters, in contrast
to the macrocells that operate in a range up to several tens of kilometers. Small
cells include: femtocells (10 m), picocells (100 m) and microcells (1km-3km) [3],
[5]. Grouping these different small cells with the typical macrocells give rise to a
SCN.
• Small Cell Networks: SCNs are heterogeneous networks that comprise all forms
of cells. They are based on a very dense deployment of small cells in order to
provide superior cellular coverage in residential, enterprise, or hot spot outdoor
environments (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: A typical small cell network deployment.
In essence, the small cell technology was introduced as an ecological and economical
solution to overcome the imminent wireless capacity crunch. Indeed, the impressive
increase of sophisticated mobile devices (smartphone, laptop and tablet), coupled with
the proliferation of social networks mainly contribute to the exponential growth of data
traffic leading wireless networks to their capacity limits. The main benefits of including
low-power, low-cost and self-organizing base stations to the traditional mobile networks
are the following [3], [4]:
• Dense deployment of small cells closer to the users can reduce the number of devices
sharing the bandwidth of a single cell. This provides a higher data-rate for each
served user and hence improves the capacity and overall performance of the radio
access network.
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• The low power transmission in small cells compared to macro cells reduces the
network energy consumption, if well designed. Furthermore, the deployment of
self-powered small cells and the integration of advanced energy saving techniques
can potentially enhance the network performance in terms of energy consumption.
• SCNs do not require any specific infrastructure since they share the existing point-
to-point wireless and/or wired backhaul and they might be installed in the users’
homes, street equipments, and enterprise buildings. Moreover, the unplanned de-
ployment of small cells reduces the need of costly network planners and hence the
operational expenses.
Despite the promising potential of SCNs, they present a number of limitations we
need to consider when proposing solutions that aim to increase their capacity and per-
formance such as reliability, throughput, etc.
2.3 Challenges Facing Small Cell Networks
This section discusses several challenges that face the development and the deployment
of small cells [4]. The most pertinent challenges are:
• Self-organization: Since some small cells are user-deployed, they require self-
configuration, self-optimization and self-healing capabilities. They need to be au-
tomatically configured before entering the operational state, optimize their pa-
rameters to improve coverage, reduce energy consumption and interference, and
perform recovery from node failures. The insurance of the self-organization in
SCNs is challenging due to the diversity of coexisting cells and their different char-
acteristics which increase the number of parameters that need to be considered.
• Handover: The limited coverage range of small cells and the frequent mobility of
users increase the call to the handover process. This one consists in transferring
the users at the border of adjacent cells to less congested cell in order to improve
the QoS. However, the existing handover mechanisms increase the system load due
to the large number of cells. Hence, more appropriate procedures are required.
• Interference management: The unplanned user-deployment and the large num-
ber of BSs cause interference problem in SCNs, which arise from macro cells as
well as from neighbor small cells. The interference problem might significantly
deteriorate the system performance, hence, interference management techniques
are needed to reduce interferences.
• Backhaul management: The backhaul infrastructure connect small cells to the
core network. It presents several issues related to the lacks of security, QoS and
the limited bandwidth.
– Security: The communications are performed over uncontrolled backhaul in-
frastructure. Thus, secured mechanisms are required to ensure the confiden-
tiality and the integrity of exchanged data.
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– QoS: No packet loss and minimal delay should be guaranteed to ensure a high
QoS with unreliable links. For this, small cells may allow a handover to the
macrocell when it is necessary.
– Bandwidth limitation: The backhaul capacity is limited since using fiber-
connections, as a solution, is expressive. To avoid creating a traffic bottleneck,
one novel approach based on distributed storage was proposed in [6].
• Predictive scheduling: Many recent works focus on the prediction of users’ be-
haviors. Actually, a number of predictors reach an average prediction accuracy of
more than 60% [10]-65% [11]. The attractiveness of these results makes the pre-
diction an important parameter that might allow the implementation of efficient
algorithm for resource allocation in SCNs, given predictable behaviors of frequent
users. Thus, new techniques that exploit the periodic behavior of users, the ac-
cessed content in a specific places and times, could be developed to improve users’
QoE. This might include models for caching, pre-allocating resources over time
and joint backhaul caching and radio resource allocation.
The limited backhaul capacity issue is the subject of this internship. Thereafter, we
introduce the distributed-storage based solutions to deal with this problem.
2.4 Distributed Caching in Small Cell Networks
The main idea behind the introduction of distributed caching into SCNs is bringing
data closer to the users such as caching replace the backhaul communication [6]. For
this purpose, authors in [6] proposed to equip femtocells with large caching capacity
and integrate to the network, fixed wireless storage nodes called helpers. These caching
nodes store the most popular files and handle the mobile users requests locally. In the
case of unavailability of data in their cache, the macro BSs serve the users.
This idea was extended in [7] by considering also the users as caching nodes. The
data traffic between helpers and users is called device to device (D2D) communication.
The authors described the architecture of a network as a set of square cells such as one
macrocell serve N users in a given square. Each cell is then divided into smaller squares
with equal size named, clusters. The assignment of data is performed centrally by a
macrocell BS which offer an efficient assignment of data to the mobile users. Another
proposed solution consists in randomly allocating data according to a given probability
density function.
2.4.1 Related Works
The main goal of the proposed approach in [6] is to find an optimal allocation that
minimizes the expected delay for data recovery. It is assumed that users may recover
the data either from a central node (MC) or locally from a fixed number of storage nodes
(SBSs). Indeed, once the optimal allocation is determined, the central node disperses
the data according to their given popularity over the storage nodes. These nodes have a
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limited storage capacity and the links between the nodes and the collector have a finite
transmission rate.
Two cases were considered: uncoded and coded distributed storage. In the first
version, the data are stored directly in the storage nodes. The authors showed that
defining the optimal allocation is NP-complete. To solve this problem, they reformulate
the minimization of the average delay of all collectors as a maximization of a submodular
function [9] and showed that the storage capacity constraint forms a matroid constraint
[9]. Thereby, they offer a greedy algorithm where at each step an assignment of data i
to a specific storage node j is selected.
In the second version, the data are encoded and then stored over storage nodes. The
average delay recovery is computed by taking into account that the collector needs to
contact j storage nodes to recover the original object and j − 1 nodes are not enough.
Using this formulation, the obtained objective function which is convex and the con-
straint of the upper bound storage capacity is linear. Thus, the problem can be solved
using standard convex optimization [8] as it can be turned into a linear program by
introducing new variables.
2.4.2 Discussion
When data are distributed over the nodes of the network, the allocation process should
take into account the dense deployment of small BSs. The existing allocation solutions
propose to spread the data according to the objects popularity. Hence, a popular object
can be stored in many nodes that are located in the same area which leads to waste of
storage space. Moreover, the assignment of data considers only the global popularity
of content, i.e., the proportion of users that would request each data. However, the
popularity of data can differ from a SBS to another SBS depending on the preferences of
users that would connect to each SBS. On another hand, the authors in [8] formulated the
optimization problem in order to reduce the recovery delay, whereas they do not take into
account the mobility of users. In fact, the expected performance such as the recovery
delay is not static since it changes with topology changes over time. The proposed
algorithm to assign data is a centralized algorithm, executed in a central application
server. However, a distributed algorithm could be more appropriate in such a system
in which SBSs are owned by different users or operators and data delivered by several
content providers. Thus, the information about the stored data in each SBS might be
private and for secrecy reasons the information should be kept local.
2.5 Conclusion
The increasing demand of data prompted the apparition of SCNs as an ecological and
economical solution to provide a better coverage and improve the capacity performance
of cellular networks. However, SCNs present some limitations and the most significant
is the limited backhaul capacity. To deal with this problem, distributed caching over
SCNs was proposed as a solution. The main idea behind distributed caching is to bring
data as close as possible to users by storing them and introducing redundancies in the
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small cells. This concept would allow small cells to serve users requests locally and thus
reducing the backhaul links load.
In order to take a maximal benefit from the caching process in SCNs, optimal caching
strategies need to be developed. In general, the caching problem is formulated as opti-
mization problems which are mostly combinatorial or have exponential complexity. In
the following chapter we present game theory as an alternative solution to solve these
problems. More specifically, we will introduce matching games which were mainly pro-
posed to provide mathematical tools for modeling many economical systems and after-
ward, have been extensively used in literature to solve allocation problems in telecom-
munication systems.
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3 Introduction to Matching Theory
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we showed that self-organization can be seen as the most impor-
tant feature in small cell networks which allows terminals and base stations to interact
and self-adapt intelligently without any external or central control. The importance of
self-organization motivates researchers to exploit the intelligence of network equipments
by addressing the wireless communications’ problems in a distributed manner. For in-
stance, resources time, spectrum, and space are limited, while the demand for mobile
communication and services have grown exponentially, increasing the need of new tech-
niques to manage and allocate these resources efficiently. Therefore, resource allocation
problems such as power allocation, spectrum allocation, user grouping, user selection,
resource assignment, and beamforming optimization, are widely studied, and are often
formulated as optimization problems. However, most of the resource allocation problems
are combinatorial. The exponential complexity of these problems prompts the introduc-
tion of new centralized and distributed mechanisms, different from the conventional
optimization theory. Game theory is one of approaches extensively used for modeling.
It was mainly introduced to explain and predict the behavior of complex real world eco-
nomic systems. The theory was then developed widely and applied to many fields such
as biology, computer science, philosophy and telecommunication. Formally, game theory
is a set of suitable mathematical tools that provides a language to formulate, analyze
and understand scenarios between competing or cooperating players.
In this work, we focus on the game-theoretic matching problem which has been
adopted in many real-world systems such as the assignment of interns to hospitals in
United States. Especially, we introduce the two-sided matching games which refer to the
markets of bilateral nature. In such a market, players belong to only one of two disjoint
sets. For instance, in the interns and hospitals market, if an intern decides to not do
his/her internship and quit the market, he/she cannot join the other side of the market
and become a hospital. The members of the two sets are called and they want to be
matched. Depending on the number of partners to which an agent of each side, wants
to be matched to, the two-sided matching games can be divided into three categories:
one-to-one, many-to-one and many-to-many matchings. In one-to-one matching, each
agent is matched to one agent of the opposite set (e.g., marriage market), while in
the many-to-one matching, in one side, agents are matched to one agent and in the
other side, agents are matched to a group of agents (e.g., colleges admissions market).
Many-to-many matching is a generalized model where each agent of the two sides can
be matched to many agents of the other side (e.g., firms and workers). Matching games
are also classified into three other classes: canonical matching games, matching with
externalities and matching with dynamics.
In the remainder of this chapter, we first detail the three classes of matching games:
one-to-one, many-to-one and many-to-many matching games, by giving the formal de-
scription of the corresponding real-world markets and the main results in literature. We
then provide an overview of the three last classes: canonical games, matching with ex-
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ternalities and matching with dynamics. Finally, we conclude this chapter with a brief
summary.
3.2 One-to-One Matching Model
One of the most popular matching problems is the stable marriage problem, where a
set of women and a set of men decide to whom to get married. The marriage model is
a two-sided one-to-one matching problem where each agent aims to be matched to one
agent of the opposite set, according to his/her preferences. In fact, every agent has a
preference list over the set of the opposite sex which could be related to face feature,
eyes color, hair length, etc. The agent’s preferences are called strict when the agent is
not indifferent between any two partners of the other side, or between being matched to
a partner and being unmatched.
3.2.1 Centralized Stable Matching for Marriage Problem
The formal description of the marriage model is given as follows. We consider an instance
I of the stable marriage problem involving N men andM women. The two finite disjoint
sets of men and women are denotedM = {m1,m2, . . . ,mN} andW = {w1, w2, . . . , wM},
respectively. Each agent ranks agents of the opposite set to form his/her preferences list
of the form pm1 = w1, w2, ..., ∅, meaning that m1 prefers w1 to w2 and so on, until
he/she prefers to remain single. The preference relation of an agent k over the set of
his/her potential partners is denoted ≺k. w1 ≺m1 w2 means that man m1 prefers to be
matched to woman w1 than to be matched to woman w2. When an agent k prefers to
remain single than to be matched to an agent l, l is said to be unacceptable to k, and
this preference is denoted ∅ ≺k l. The outcome of the marriage market is a matching µ
defined as follows [12]:
Definition 3.1. A matching µ is a function from the set M×W onto the set M×W
such that:
1. |µ(k)| = 1 for every k ∈ W ∪M;
2. µ(m) ∈ W ∪ ∅ and µ(w) ∈M∪ ∅;
3. w = µ(m) if and only if m = µ(w).
So µ(m) = w denotes that man m is a partner of woman w under the matching µ.
Similarly, µ(w) = m denotes that woman w is a partner of man m under the matching
µ. In a marriage market, the main goal is to form a matching where agents do not
have an incentive to break up and form new marriages. Such a matching is called stable
matching. For this purpose, many criteria should be considered such as the individual
rationality and blocking partners [12].
Definition 3.2. A matching µ is individually rational to all agents, if and only if there
does not exist an agent k who prefers being single to being matched with µ(k), i.e.,
µ(k) ≺k ∅.
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Definition 3.3. A matching µ is blocked by a pair of agents (m,w) if they each prefer
each other to the partner they receive at µ, i.e., µ(m) ≺m w and µ(w) ≺w m.
Thus, a stable matching could be defined as follows:
Definition 3.4. A matching µ is stable if and only if it is individual rational, and is
not blocked by any pair of agents.
In[12], the authors showed that:
Theorem 3.1. A stable matching exists for every marriage market.
They proved the existence of a stable matching by proposing a deferred acceptance
algorithm (Gale-Shapley algorithm), which always finds a stable set of marriages. The
deferred acceptance algorithm works as follows:
• Step 1: Each agent defines his/her strict preference list over the agents of the
opposite side. When an agent is indifferent between two partners, an order is
defined randomly or based on a specific metric such as the alphabetic order;
• Step 2:
1. Each man proposes to his favorite partner if he has any acceptable choices;
2. Each woman keeps the most preferred proposal among the acceptable ones if
any, and rejects the others;
• Step 3:
1. Each rejected man proposes to his favorite woman who has not rejected him
yet;
2. Each woman chooses her favorite partner from the group of the new proposers
and the proposer kept at the previous step;
• Step 4: Redo Step 3 until no proposal could be made, i.e. each man was either
accepted by a woman or rejected by all the women of his preference list.
The optimality of the resulting matching µ of the deferred acceptance algorithm is
also an important parameter. A matching µ is called M-optimal if every man likes it
at least as well as any other stable matching. Similarly, a matching µ is W-optimal if
every woman likes it at least as well as any other stable matching. The authors showed
that such optimal stable matchings do exist [12].
Theorem 3.2. The resulting matching of the deferred acceptance algorithm with men
proposing is M-optimal, whereas the resulting matching of the deferred acceptance algo-
rithm with women proposing is W-optimal.
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The optimality of the stable matching was proved by showing that, in the deferred
acceptance algorithm, no man is ever rejected by a woman who could be matched to
him at a stable matching.
One of the most important concepts in matching theory is the core of the game.
In the marriage market, rules of the game consist in the agreement of the two sets
agents on their matching. The rules of the game coupled with the preferences of players
induce a relation on the outcomes, called the domination relation, where a matching µ
dominates a matching µ′ if there is a coalition (i.e., subset) S whose members have both
the incentive and the means to replace µ′ with µ [?].
Definition 3.5. The core of the game is the set of undominated outcomes.
The difference between the core of a game and the set of a stable matching relies on
the fact that an outcome fails to be in the core if it is blocked by any coalition of agents,
whereas it fails to be in a stable matching only if it is blocked by some individual agent
or by some pair of agents consisting of a man and a woman.
In the marriage market, even when coalitions other than singletons and pairs are
considered, the properties of the market remain correct [?].
Theorem 3.3. The core of the marriage market equals the set of stable matchings.
The proposed deferred acceptance algorithm is a centralized algorithm, i.e., the al-
gorithm is executed in a central agent which should know all the players preference lists
as well as their partners from the resulting matching. However, the players may want
to do not disclose their preference list and keep secret. For this purpose, a distributed
version of deferred acceptance algorithm was proposed in [21].
3.2.2 Distributed Stable Matching for Marriage Problem
The distributed version of Gale-Shapley algorithm, proposed in [21], consists of two
procedures for men and women. The men and women procedures are executed asyn-
chronously, in each man and each woman agent, respectively. The following messages
are exchanged between men and women:
• Propose: Men send this message to women to propose engagement;
• Accept: Women send this message to men after receiving a proposal message to
notify acceptance;
• Delete: Women send this message to men to notify that they are not available
for the proposing men; this occurs either (i) proposing man an engagement to a
woman but she has a better partner or (ii) a woman acceptant an engagement with
other man more preferred than the proposing one;
• Stop: This is a special message to notify that execution must end; it is sent by an
special agent after detecting quiescence.
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At the initialization step, all the men and women do not have partners. On one hand,
each man executes the following steps:
• Step 1: If a man is free and his preference list is not empty, he sends a proposition
to the first woman in his preference list;
• Step 2: Wait for a response message;
• Step 3: If the response is a accept message, the man confirms the engagement;
otherwise (i.e., the response is a delete message), the man deletes the sender from
his preference list and he becomes free.
• Step 4: Redo the Steps 1-3 until receiving a stop message.
On the other hand, each woman executes the following steps:
• Step 1: When a woman receives a propose message from a man, she rejects him if
he is not in her preference list. Otherwise, she accepts him by sending a message
accept ;
• Step 2: The woman sends a message reject to all the men who appear after the
accepted one in the previous step, in her preference list. Also, she removes all these
men from her preference list;
• Step3: Redo Step 1-2 until receiving a stop message.
3.3 Many-to-One Matching Model
3.3.1 The College Admissions Model with Responsive Preferences
Another well-known two-sided matching problem is college admissions market which
involves a set of N colleges and a set of M students. The question that arose in this
market is which and how many students will be admitted at each college, knowing
that each one can offer admissions to only q applicants. There are many other matching
problems that fit with the many-to-one problem description, where agents are individual
on one side of the market and on the other side agents are institutions, such as: firms
and workers, hospitals and medical students [12].
Formally, in the college admissions game, the two finite and disjoint sets of colleges
and students are denoted C = {c1, c2, ..., cN} and S = {s1, s2, ..., sM}, respectively. As
in the marriage market, each agent has a preference list over the agents of the opposite
set. In this model, each college ci can accept qi (qi ≥ 1) students, known as quotas
Q = {q1, q2, ..., qN}, whereas in the the marriage market all the agents accept only one
partner. The marriage game could be seen as a special case of the college admissions
game where colleges’ quotas equal one (qi = 1, ∀i = 1, ..., N). The quota of each college
is represented by a waiting list of students. We note that no student is assigned to more
than one college and no college is assigned more than its quota of students [?].
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Definition 3.6. A matching µ is a function from the set C ∪S into the set of unordered
families of the elements of C ∪ S such that:
1. |µ(s)| = 1 for every s, and µ(s) = ∅ if µ(s) /∈ C;
2. |µ(c)| = qc for every college c, and if the number of students in µ(c), say r, is less
than qc, then µ(c) contains qc − r copies of ∅;
3. µ(s) = c if and only if s ∈ µ(c).
So µ(s) = c denotes that student s is enrolled at college c under the matching µ, and
µ(c) = {si, sj , ∅} denotes that college c, with quota qc = 3, enrolls students si and sj
and has one position unfilled.
An extension of the marriage model was examined in order to preserve its properties
in the admissions problem. It was shown that the Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 can be extended
to the college admissions problem. However, Theorem 3.3 could not be extended because
of the incomplete information related to the preferences of colleges over the outcomes.
In fact, to state this theorem, each college should specify its preferences over sets of
students, while in the description of this model, preferences of students and colleges are
over individuals. Thus, colleges with quotas greater than one are not able to compare
groups of students. To define a complete model and allow colleges to compare outcomes
of matchings, the authors in [17] introduced the concept of responsive preferences.
Definition 3.7. The preferences are called responsive if: for all set S with |S| < qi and
any students si and sj /∈ S, ci prefers S ∪ si to S ∪ sj if and only if si is preferred to sj
under ci’s preferences over individual students, and prefers S ∪ si to S if si is acceptable
to ci.
It should be noted that a college could be indifferent between two outcomes. For in-
stance, we suppose a college c with a quota qc=2 and a preference list P (c) = s1, s2, s4, s3, ∅,
over a set of students C = {s1, s2, s3, s4}. When preferences are responsive, college c
would prefer to admit students {s1, s2} than to admit students {s1, s3}, because student
s2 is more preferred than student s3. However, college c is indifferent between admitting
the two sets of students {s1, s4} and {s2, s3}.
The authors in [17], showed that even when the specification of the model are complete,
Theorem 3.3 will be false as long as the preferences of colleges for sets of students are
related to their preferences over individual students.
In [12], because of the responsiveness of preferences, the deferred acceptance algo-
rithm of the marriage problem was extended to the college admissions problem. The
authors in [16], gave a formal proof of the equivalence of the two problems by replacing
each college ci by qi copies of ci denoted c11, c12, ..., c1qi . Each of these cij has preferences
identical with those of ci but with quota 1. Each student who has ci in his preference
list replaces ci by c11, c12, ..., c1qi , in that order of preference. Thus, they formulated the
original problem as a one-to-one matching. The deferred acceptance algorithm for the
marriage problem was modified and adapted to the college admissions problem [12]. The
algorithm is given as follows:
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• Step 1: All the students apply to the college of their first choice;
• Step 2: Each college places on its waiting lists the qi most preferred students, or
all the applicants if they are less than qi, and rejects the rest;
• Step 3: Rejected applicants apply again to their following choice;
• Step 4: Each college selects the top qi from among the new applicants and those
on its waiting list, pUEs these on its waiting list and rejects the rest;
• Step5: Redo Steps 3-4 until every applicant is either on a waiting list or has been
rejected by every college.
The referred stability in this model is the same stability defined in the one-to-one
matching problem, where the essential coalitions that cause instabilities are pairs of
agents and individuals. This concept of stability is called pairwise stability. In many-to-
one matching, coalitions consisting of multiple colleges and students need to be consid-
ered. A coalition A is said to be a blocking coalition for a matching µ, if students and
colleges in A, by matching among themselves could all get an assignment preferable to
µ [13]. Formally saying, a matching µ is blocked by a coalition A, if there exists another
matching µ′, such that for all students s, and for all colleges c in A,
1. µ′(s) ∈ A, i.e., every student in A who is matched by µ′ is matched to a college in
A;
2. µ(s) ≺s µ
′(s), i.e., every student in A prefers his new match to his old one;
3. k ∈ µ′(c) implies k ∈ µ′(c) ∪ A, i.e., every college in A is matched at µ′ to new
students only from A, although it may continue to be matched to its old students
from µ′(c);
4. µ(c) ≺c µ
′(c), i.e., every college in A prefers its new set of students to its old one.
Now, we define another kind of stability that consider all the coalitions [13].
Definition 3.8. A group stable matching is one that is not blocked by any coalition.
When preferences are responsive the two stability concepts, group stability and pair-
wise stability, are equivalent [13]. Hence, the set of group stable matchings is always
non-empty.
3.3.2 The Firms-Workers Model with Substitutable Preferences
In the previous section, where preferences of colleges over the set of students are respon-
sive, we saw that the theorem 3.1 could be extended to the college admissions problem.
In other words, the set of stable matchings for the college admissions model with respon-
sive preferences is always non-empty. In this section, we consider a weaker condition than
responsiveness that preserve the non-emptiness of the set of stable matchings as well as
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many other properties. These results are due to the fact that the set of stable matchings
continues to be non-empty as long as colleges’ preferences over groups of students are
such that the colleges regard individual students more as substitutes than as comple-
ments. This means that a college will continue to want to accept a student si even if
some of the other students become unavailable. In fact, this condition make the deferred
acceptance algorithm operate as it did when the preferences are responsive.
To well describe the many-to-one matching with substitutable preferences, we con-
sider the labor market firms and workers. The sets of firms and workers are denoted
F = {f1, f2, ..., fN} and W = {w1, w2, ..., wM}, respectively. Workers have preferences
over individual firms, and firms have preferences over subsets of workers. The worker
preference list is represented by a list of acceptable firms P (w) = fi, fj , fk, ∅, and the
firm preferences by a list of acceptable workers P#(f) = S1, S2, ..., Sk, ∅, where each
Si is a subset of the set of workers W. We denote the preferences of all the agents
P = (P#(f1), P
#(f2), ..., P
#(fN ), P (w1), P (w2), ..., P (wM )).
When firms are faced to a set S of workers, each firm f defines its most preferred
subset of S it would hire, which could be an empty set or equal to the set S. This set
represents the firm f ’s choice from S, denoted S′ = Chf (S). Formally, the set S
′ ⊂ S is
defined as follows:
• ∀S′′ ⊆ S, S′′ w S
′.
Now, we can define the substitutability property of preferences.
Definition 3.9. A firm f’s preferences over sets of workers has the property of substi-
tutability if, for any set S that contains workers w and w′, if w is in Chf (S) then w is
in Chf (S − w
′).
According to this definition, we can see that responsiveness includes the substitutabil-
ity property. In fact, the choice set from any set of students of a college with quota q is
either the q most preferred acceptable students in the set, or all the acceptable students
in the set. In this model, a matching µ is blocked by a firm f if µ(f) 6= Chf (µ(f)), i.e.,
the firm f would prefer to hire all the assigned workers by the matching µ. A matching
µ might be blocked by an individual firm f without being individually irrational, since
it might still be that ∅ f µ(f). Similarly, a matching µ is blocked by a worker-firm
pair (w, f) if w and f are not matched at µ but would both prefer if f hired w; that
is, if µ(w) 6= f and if µ(w) ≺w f and w ∈ Chf (µ(f) ∪ w). If the firms have responsive
preferences, this definition is equivalent to the used one for college admissions problem.
Definition 3.10. A matching µ is stable if it is not blocked by any individual agent or
any worker-firm pair.
Theorem 3.4. When firms have substitutable preferences, the set of stable matching is
always nonempty.
This theorem was proved by modifying the deferred acceptance algorithm with firms
proposing [13]. The modified version works as follows:
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• Step 1: Each firm proposes to its most preferred set of workers;
• Step 2: Each worker rejects all but most preferred acceptable firm that proposes
to him;
• Step 3: Each firm proposes to its most preferred set of workers including the
workers whom it previously proposed to and who have not yet rejected it without
including the works who have previously rejected him;
• Step 4: Each worker rejects all but the most preferred acceptable firm that has
proposed so far;
• Step 5: Redo Steps 3-4 until there are no rejections.
Also, the authors showed that:
Theorem 3.5. When firms have substitutable preferences and preferences are strict,
the deferred acceptance algorithm with firms proposing produces a firm-optimal stable
matching. Also, the deferred acceptance algorithm with workers proposing produces a
worker-optimal stable matching.
3.4 Many-to-Many Matching Model
The many-to-many matching problem is a generalized model of the two previous match-
ing models: one-to-one and many-to-one matchings. To describe this model, we extend
the labor market of firms and workers studied in many-to-one matching with substi-
tutable preferences. Similarly, we suppose two sets of agents, firms and workers denoted
F and W, respectively. Unlike many-to-one matching, in this model each worker can
work for many firms and each firm can hire a group of workers. Every worker w and
every firm f has a quota, denoted qw and qf respectively, meaning that a worker w can
work for at most qw firms, and a firm f can hire at most qf workers. Moreover, each
worker has a preference list over subsets of firms and each firm has a preference list over
subsets of workers. A similar set to the Chf set defined previously for firms is defined
for workers, denoted Chw(S), representing the worker w’ most preferred subset of the
set of firms S. Thus, the outcome of the matching is an assignment of a set of workers
to each firm and a set of firms to each worker. Formally, a many-to-many matching µ is
defined as follows:
Definition 3.11. A matching µ is a mapping from the set F ∪ W into the set of all
subsets of F ∪W such that for every w ∈ W and f ∈ F [14]:
1. µ(f) is contained in F and µ(w) is contained in F ;
2. |µ(f)| ≤ qf for all f in F :
3. |µ(w)| ≤ qw for all w in W;
4. w is in µ(f) if and only if f is in µ(w).
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Now, we define a new type of preferences over sets of agents which is stronger than
the two previous conditions defined in many-to-one section: substitutability and respon-
siveness.
Definition 3.12. Separability means that for any agent i’s set of potential partners S,
S\b ≺i S ∪ b if and only if b ≺i ∅.
As for many-to-one matching, the instability in many-to-many market is not only
caused by pairs of agents, since an agent of each side, might be matched to a group of
players of the other side. Thus, the market instabilities might be caused by coalitions
that consist of a group of workers and firms. In other words, a matching µ might be
instable due to a set of firms and workers, that could arrange together and have more
preferred partners than the assigned partners under the matching µ. Different stability
concepts were introduced in the literature on many-to-many matchings. Hereafter, we
define the most general ones.
Definition 3.13. A matching µ is pairwise-stable if there no agents k and l who are not
partners, but by becoming partners, possibly dissolving some of their partnerships given
by µ to remain within their quotas and possibly keeping other ones, can both obtain a
strictly preferred set of partners.
Definition 3.14. A matching µ is in the core (corewise-stable) if there is no subset of
agents who by forming all their partnerships only among themselves, can all obtain a
strictly preferred set of partners.
Definition 3.15. A matching µ is setwise stable if there is no subset of agents who by
forming new partnerships only among themselves, possibly dissolving some partnerships
of µ to remain within their quotas and possibly keeping other ones, can all obtain a
strictly preferred set of partners.
The authors in [23] proved that setwise stability is equivalent to the group stability
introduced by [22] for the college admissions problem with responsive preferences. The
author in [22] showed that setwise stability is the strongest stability concept by including
the pairwise and corewise stability concepts. To prove it, the authors gave an example
where there is a matching which is pairwise stable and corewise stable but is not setwise
stable. The players’ preferences in this example satisfy separability condition which is
stronger than substitutability and responsiveness.
The main results on stability of many-to-many matching, given by the authors in [?],
are as follows.
Theorem 3.6. In the many-to-many matching model with responsive preferences, the
set of pairwise stable matching is non-empty for all preferences, but a stable matching
need not to be in the core.
Theorem 3.7. In many-to-many matching, when all the agents have substitutable pref-
erences, the set of pairwise stable matchings is nonempty.
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These Theorems imply that even when a pair worker-firm cannot arrange together
to have better partners, a larger coalition consisting of many workers and firms could
give to all of them a more preferred assignments. Theorem 2.7 was proved by proposing
the following algorithm which always find a pairwise stable matching.
• Step1: Each firm f makes offers to every worker w in the set Q(f, 1) = Chf (W);
• Step k:
– (i) Each worker w rejects any offers received so far that are not in the set
Chw(O(w, k − 1)), where O(w, k − 1) is the set of offers w has received in
steps 1,...k − 1,
– (ii) Each firm f who has received at least one rejection in the part (i) of step
k and who now has (nonrejected) offers oUEstanding to the students in the
set N(f, k), and has been rejected in steps 1, ..., k by the workers in the set
R(f, k), makes (or renews) offers to his most preferred set of workers Q(f, k)
in the collection of sets {Q ⊂ W − R(f, k) such that Q contains N(f, k)}.
(Subtraction of sets is denoted -). That is, f ’s oUEstanding offers at the end
of step k include all those issued at previous steps and not yet rejected and
none of those that have already been rejected.
• The algorithm stops at any stepk = T at which no rejections are issued, and the
resulting matching is µ such that µ(f) = N(f, T ) for each f in F .
Moreover, authors in [22] showed that there exists matching that every worker likes it at
least as well as any other stable matching. Similarly, there exists a matching that every
firm likes at least as well as any other matching.
Theorem 3.8. When preferences are substitutable, the set of pairwise stable matchings
is non-empty and there are firm-optimal and worker-optimal pairwise stable outcomes.
There are many other stability and preferences concepts that were introduced for
many-to-many matching such as strong separability and fix-point set [19]. While substi-
tutability means that if a worker is chosen from a given set of workers, he is also chosen
from a smaller set of workers; strong substitutability means that if a worker is chosen
from a given set of workers, he is also chosen from a less preferred set of workers. Strong
substitutability is stronger than substitutability but is weaker than separability and not
stronger than responsiveness. The formal definition is given as follows:
Definition 3.16. strong substitutability requires: if hiring w is optimal when the set
of available workers is {w} ∪ S′, and the firm prefers S′ to S, then hiring w must still
optimal when the set of available workers is {w} ∪ S.
The main result including strong substitutability is the following:
Theorem 3.9. If firms’ preferences are substitutable and workers’ preferences are strongly
substitutable, the theory of many-to-many matching parallels the theory of many-to-one
matchings: the setwise stable set equals the pairwise stable set.
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The fix-point set is defined as follows:
Definition 3.17. fix-point set is a matching where each agent k is choosing his/her best
set of partners, out of the set of potential partners who, given their current match, are
willing to link to k.
The main results on the fix-point set are given in [19]:
Theorem 3.10. If preferences are substitutable, the fix-point set is not empty. And the
fix-point set equals the set of individually rational and pairwise matchings
The authors gave also an algorithm that find a fix-point matching and proved that if
firms’ preferences are substitutable and workers’ preferences are strongly substitutable,
the fix-point set equals the set of setwise stable matchings, and a matching in the fix-
point must be in the individually rational core. Thus, setwise stable matchings exist,
the individually rational core is nonempty, and they gave an algorithm that finds a
matching in the individually core that is setwise stable. The same results hold when
firms’ preferences are strongly substitutable and workers’ preferences are substitutable
[19].
3.5 Classification of Matching Games
Here, we give a classification of matching games taking into account the parameters
that could be considered when defining players’ preferences. It should be noted that
the matchings in each of these classes might be a one-to-one, many-to-one or many-to-
many matchings. The canonical games class is the most popular matching class and it
represents the basic model without taking into account any additional settings. Matching
with externalities class and matching with dynamics class consider the external effects
and the environment changes over the time, respectively. Here, we give a brief overview
on these three classes of matching games:
• Canonical Matching Games:
Canonical matching represents the basic matching class, in which any player n
preference function depends only on the player n himself and the potential part-
ner k in the opposite side. This class could be mainly used as a basic model to
develop more sophisticated matching classes. In the context of telecommunication
networks, this class can be used to model a basic scenario for proactive resource
allocation.
• Matching with Externalities:
In the studied matching problems (marriage market, college admissions and labor
markets) agents have preferences only over the opposite set of agents. However, in
many situations agents might define their preferences according the others matched
agents. For instance, in the marriage market jealousy may play a main role, since
a man or a woman might decide do not match at all or to accept any proposal
if two specific agents are matched to each other. This kind of effects are called
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externalities. The other considered feature in this class is called peer effect, which
corresponds to the mutual effects of players that are assigned to the same player in
the opposite set. When the externalities are present, the players should consider
how other players would react to the deviation. This class of games is mainly used
when the interferences are considered in telecommunication networks, and control
external factors such as the cell radius by the SBSs.
• Matching with Dynamics: In general, the environment in which players interact
is not static and many changes may occur. For instance, if we consider the labor
market of firms and workers, the environment changes could be the set of firms that
can at any time period dismiss their current employees or hire new ones. These
firms did not commit themselves to their employees and are called active firms. On
the other hand, workers are said active workers when they also have no commit and
can leave their current employing firm if they have a better proposal from another
firm. In the context of wireless communication, the environment changes might
be for instance, the mobility of users or the backhaul state according to which the
players could be better off under another matching. Thus at the beginning of each
time period, based on the constraints and the previous matching, a new matching
is defined between players.
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3.6 Conclusion
Matching games was first introduced to explain and predict the behavior of complex
economic systems. In this chapter we focused on the two-sided matching markets, where
the real-world system consists of two sets of players and each player belongs to only one
side. The main goal in the system is to assign to each player one or many players of the
other side based on their preferences and their quotas which represent respectively, the
most preferred and the number of players they want to be matched to. Matching theory
represents one of the most important game theoretic approaches that were extended
and applied to telecommunication systems, mainly for resources management. In fact,
network’s resources such as backhauling and spectrum are limited whereas the mobile
data traffic has been grown exponentially. In order to design efficient techniques for
resources management, the resources allocation problems are formulated as optimization
problems. However, most of the formulated problems are combinatorial with exponential
complexity which prompted the integration of game theoretic approaches to solve these
problems.
The major result on two-sided matching games was given by Gale and Shapley in
their prominent paper [12]. The authors studied the marriage market where the goal
is to match each man of the market to a woman. Their main result is the deferred
acceptance algorithm they proposed. The algorithm produces a stable matching between
the two sides of the market, in the sense that no agent will have the incentive to leave
his partner for another more preferred player. Thus, the essential coalitions that might
cause instabilities in this market are pairs of agents. This concept of stability is known as
pairwise stability. The second most popular matching problem is the college admissions
market where a set of students is assigned to each college. This model was proved to be
equivalent to the marriage model and hence, the deferred acceptance algorithm provide
also a pairwise stable matching for this market. However, in this model, the coalitions
that cause instabilities might consist of more than a pair of players. Thus, the setwise
stability concept is considered as being more appropriate for multiple partners models. In
[22], the authors proved that under certain restrictions on the preference lists of players,
the pairwise and setwise stability concepts are equivalent and the deferred acceptance
algorithm provides a non-empty setwise stable matching. The more general matching
model is the firms and workers labor market in which a worker can work for a group
of firms and each firm can hire a group of worker. This model is not more complicated
than the two previous models and the results on college admissions problem could not
being extended. The main results on this model were given by [18] giving an algorithm
that produce a pairwise stable matching when the agent’s preferences are substitutable.
In the next chapter, we show how the caching problem in SCNs can be modeled as
a matching game. Principally, we model the caching problem as a one-to-one matching




The limited backhaul capacity is considered as one of the most important issues in SCNs.
In fact, the success and popularity of Youtube, NetFlix and other video content providers
have mainly contributed in the growth of network traffic. Moreover, the high bitrate of
live streaming and Video on Demand (VoD), compared to Web pages and other content,
generates most of the traffic and produces network congestion. This increases both
delays and interruptions in video streaming which badly affect users’ QoE resulting in
churn users and inducing lost revenue for content providers. In this chapter we propose
a caching strategy for content providers that aims to ensure a fast response time and
reduce the load of backhaul links.
The main work [8] that introduced caching strategy to deal with the limited backhaul
capacity formulated the caching problem as an optimization problem, in which the goal
is to reduce the download time of content in the network. While most of the resource
allocation problems in SCNs are formulated as optimization problems, our solution is
based on matching theory which provides practical solutions for hard optimization prob-
lems. We model the storage problem as an iterative one-to-one matching between two
opposite sets of CPSs and SBSs, respectively. On one hand, content providers has sets
files stored in their own data servers and they aim to cache the files closer to the users in
SBSs, in order to reduce the delivery time without lags and interruptions. On the other
hand, SBSs have a limited storage capacity and aim to store the most popular files in
order to reduce the backhaul load in the network.
The authors in [8] proposed to start by caching the most popular files, i.e., the files
that have a hight probability to be requested by the users. However, depending on
the preferences of users that are connected to each SBS over time, the popularity of
files differs from a SBS to another SBS. In our work, instead of considering the global
popularity of files, we define a local popularity at each SBS according to which SBSs
choose the files they would store firstly. This parameter represents the preference relation
of each SBS over the files stored in the CPSs. The preference relation of each CPS is
defined depending on the delivery time at each SBS. In other words, a CPS would prefer
to store its files in a SBS that offer the minimal download time to the users.
This chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the model and formu-
late the optimization problem for caching in SCNs. In section 3, we model the caching
problem as an iterative one-to-one matching game and define the preferences of each
team. In section 4, we propose an iterative algorithm which find a stable and optimal
matching between CPSs and SBSs.
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4.2 System Model
We consider a network in which content providers store their files in their own servers
and would like to cache the files deeper in the network in order to ensure a better
QoE for users. We suppose a network comprising N users equipments (UEs) denoted
N = {u1, u2, . . . , uN}, served by K CPSs denoted C = {c1, c2, ..., cK} and M SBSs
denoted M = {s1, s2, . . . , sM} (see Figure 2). Each CPS ci is connected to the SBSs
through low-rate backhaul links of capacities Bi = [bi1, bi2, ..., biM ] through which SBSs
download the files from CPSs. The capacities of all the backhaul links that connect the



















 ∈ {0,Z+}K×M , (1)
where bij represents the capacity of the backhaul link connecting the i
th CPS to the jth
SBS.
The downloaded files are then cached in storage units of high but limited storage ca-
pacities Q = [q1, q2, ..., qM ]. The storage capacity is defined by the number of files that
each SBS can store. Thus, each SBS can locally serve its UEs over the radio links, with











 ∈ {0,Z+}M×N , (2)
where wij represents the capacity of the radio link connecting the i
th SC to the jth UT.
In this scenario, we aim to produce a proactive download of files which we define as
follows:
Definition 4.1. Proactive Caching: A caching is said proactive if SBSs can predict the
users’ requests and download ahead of time the related files.
In the reactive caching model, files are downloaded when the users request them,
thus the following requests for the same files can be served locally. However, due to
the limited storage capacity of the SBSs and the hight number of requests, most of the
requests cannot take benefit from the caching strategy. For instance, if a file f is cached
when a user requests it, this file might not be requested subsequently. Moreover, during
peak hours, the load of the backhaul is very high and all the users need to be served at




















Figure 2: Network Model.
Let’s consider that the users might request files among a library of F files F =
{f1, f2, . . . , fF } and each file is owned by a specific content provider and stored in its
corresponding CPS. To decide which files should be cached, the SBSs predict the UEs’
requests over a time period D = t0..td. Each SBS captures the user n’s request of the
file f at time t by a variable 1n,t(f) defined as follows:
1n,t(f) =
{
1 if UE n requests file f at time t
0 otherwise
(3)
For ease of analysis, in our formulation we make the following assumptions:
1. We assume that all the files have the same size Li = L ∀i ∈ 1..F . This assumption
can, for example, reflect the practical case in which files are broken into packets of
the same size.
2. Each SBS can either store a file completely or do not store it at all. In other words,
the SBSs do not store partial files.
3. All the SBSs connected to a given UE, predict the same requests coming from this
UE.
4. Each file is owned by only one content provider and thus stored in the its own
CPS.
Now, suppose at the beginning of the time window D, each SBS sends its predictions
to a central application server. Thus, the central application will be aware of all the R










Thus, according to this information, the central application server would define a proac-
tive caching strategy such as the CPSs deliver the requested files to the SBSs which in
turn serve their UEs locally reducing the backhaul load. Let us define the two vectors
t = [tˆ1, . . . , tˆR]
′ and x = [cˆ1, . . . , cˆR]
′ as the starting delivery time and the caching SC of
the requested files, respectively (where, t′ is the transpose of the row t). We formulate
the optimization problem as a maximization of the satisfied requests in time, i.e., cached














where triw is the waiting time of a request at the CPS to be served, and t
ri
s is the required
time for a CPS to send the requested file. Bmax, Qmax andWmax represent the capacity
constraints of the backhaul links, storage units and radio links, respectively.
The formulated optimization problem is a combinatorial decision problem which
depends on the number of SBSs and UEs in the network as well as the length of the time
period D. To solve this problem, we formulate it in the next section, as a one-to-one
matching game and we propose an iterative deferred acceptance algorithm as a solution.
4.3 Problem Formulation
To model the system as a matching game, we consider the two sets C of CPSs and M
of SBSs as two teams of players (agents). In this model each content provider wants to
store its files in the SBSs and each SBS wants to store files in the limit of its storage
capacity. Thus, the goal is to match files to the appropriate SBSs in order to reduce the
load of backhaul links and improve the users’ QoE. It should be noted that the files are
matched to the SBSs but in our model, CPSs acts on behalf of the files and each of them
decides on its own files. Moreover, all the files that belong the one content provider,
i.e. the files that are stored at a specif CPS, are not necessarily cached at the same
SBS. For ease of analysis, we consider that each content provider aims to cache one file
among the files stored in its CPS. This assumption could be considered as a special case
of the model in which the most popular file is firstly cached by the CPS. The library of
files F is scattered among the CPSs such us each content provider store his files in his
CPS. Based on the preferences of the CPSs and the SBSs, the central server application
decides in which SBSs to cache each file.
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4.3.1 Preferences of the Content Provider Servers
The library of files F is scattered among the CPSs such as each content provider stores
his files in his CPS. The goal of content providers is to cache their files such as the UEs
have a hight QoE which allows them to keep their subscribers for a long time period.
In our model we mainly take into account the delivery time of the UEs. In fact, a CPS
would prefer to store the files in the SBSs that offer a smallest download time for the
UEs. Let us start by defining the required time for the nth UE to download a file f of





In fact, the download time depends on the capacity of the backhaul and the radio
links. Since the file is first downloaded by the SBSs which then serve the UEs, the
download time for a UE equals to the maximal required time among the needed times
to download the file to the SBS and to download it to the UE.












Thus, the CPSs can define their preferences list over the set of SBSs based on the delivery
time. In other words, the most preferred SBS for a CPS to cache a file is the one that
offers the smallest delivery time for its subscribers (UEs).
4.3.2 Preferences of the Small Base Stations
The objective of SBSs is to reduce the backhaul links load by storing the files before
the users requests these files. This process is beneficial when SBSs download the files
during off-hours (e.g., during the night) and serve the users locally during pick hours
(e.g. during the day). Thus, a SBS would prefer to store first a file that it has the
highest local popularity, i.e., the most requested file at that SBS.




















In this section, we propose an extension of the deferred acceptance algorithm for the
marriage problem and apply it to the caching problem.
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4.4.1 Conventional Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
First, let us describe the deferred acceptance algorithm to define a one-to-one matching
between files and SBSs and then, we propose an iterative version of this algorithm to solve
the global matching problem. The conventional deferred acceptance works as follows:
• Step 1: Each CPS sends a request to its most preferred SBS, i.e., the SBS offering
the smallest delivery time for the related file.
• Step 2: Each SBSi accepts to store the most preferred file and reject the others.
• Step 3: CPSs that were rejected at step 2 propose to their second choices.
• Step 4: Each SBS chooses its favorite CPS (i.e., file) from the new proposing SBSs
and the last chosen one, and rejects the others.
• Step 5: Redo Step 3 and Step 4 until each CPS is matched or rejected by all the
SBSs.
4.4.2 Iterative Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
The conventional deferred acceptance algorithm cannot be applied to our problem as
proposed, since one file could be assigned to several SBSs. therefore, we generalize the
previous algorithm to the case where SBSs can store more than one file. The proposed
algorithm works as follows:
• Step 1: Process Steps 1-5 above of the deferred acceptance algorithm.
• Step 2: update the preferences of CPSs and SBSs according to the previous match-
ing by subtracting the satisfied UEs and decreasing the storage capacity of SBSs
by the number of accepted files (one or zero).
• Step 3: Redo the Step 1 and Step 2 until the storage capacities of all SBSs reach
zero.
4.5 Stability and Optimality of the Proposed Algorithm
Here, we study the characteristics of the proposed deferred acceptance algorithm. As
we showed in Chapter 3, stability and optimality are the most important features of the
matching algorithms. In our context, stability means there does not exist a pair of SBS
and CPS that prefer each other to the partner they receive by the iterative matching
algorithm.
Theorem 4.1. The iterative deferred acceptance algorithm is stable and optimal.
Proof. The proof of the stability and optimality of the proposed iterative deferred ac-
ceptance algorithm can be considered as an extension of the Theorem 3.1 and Theorem
3.2. In fact, one iteration of the algorithm corresponds to the marriage problem for
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which the deferred acceptance algorithm finds a stable matching and provides an opti-
mal matching. Thus, the iteration of the deferred acceptance algorithm is also stable
and optimal.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we first formulated the caching problem as an optimization problem that
aims to maximize the number of satisfied requests proactively, i.e., the files are cached
before the users request them. However, this formulated problem is a combinatorial
problem which depends on the number of SBSs in the network. To solve the caching
problem, instead of using the conventional solutions such as heuristic and meta-heuristic
algorithms that do not ensure an optimal solution, we explored one of the game theoretic
tools that offers practical solutions for such problems. In fact, we modeled to caching
problem as an iterative one-to-one matching game between CPSs and SBSs. On one
hand, the CPSs aim to reduce the delivery time of the UEs in order to satisfy and keep
their subscribers for a long period. Thus, the CPSs define their preferences over the
set of SBSs based on the delivery time offered by each SBS. On the other hand, SBSs
aim to reduce the backhaul load by storing the most popular files locally. While in the
previous works [8], the authors exploited the global popularity of files which corresponds
the request rate of each file over all the SBSs, we restricted the files’ popularity to each
SBS. This choice is motivated by the fact that even if a file is globally popular, depending
on the SBSs’ location and the preferences of users that might connect to them, the files’
popularity changes from a SBS to another SBS. For instance, a file can be requested by
all the users connected to a given SBS while that same file is not requested at all by the
users connected to another SBS. So even even if the file has the highest global popularity
it is not efficient to store it in the some SBSs.
After the definition of the players’ preferences, we proposed an extension of the
Gale and Shapley algorithm. The goal behind this extension is to exploit the fact that
each SBS might store more than one file. One could think that since each SBS can
store many files and each file might be stored in many SBSs, why do not we model
the caching problem as a many-to-many matching game. The main reason for which
we did not choose the many-to-many formulation is because in our scenario many SBSs
might predict the same UE’s request but the UE is served by only one SBS. Thus, if
all the SBSs store the same file without taking into account the neighboring SBSs, the
process will induce a waste of storage space. To take into account this parameters more
elaborated preferences functions should be defined, as we can also use a matching game
with externalities to take into account the peer effects.




To study the performances of the proposed caching algorithm, we implemented our sce-
nario and applied two algorithms. The first caching algorithm is the iterative deferred
acceptance algorithm we proposed In Chapter 3, and the second one is a baseline algo-
rithm in which files are stored randomly in the SBSs. We performed the simulations and
recorded the numerical results for different configurations of the SBSs’ storage capacity.






We performed the simulations for five different storage ratio γ ∈ {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}.
Where γ = 0 corresponds to the case in which all the SBSs are saturated or are not
equipped with storage units, i.e., the quota of all the SBSs qi = 0, ∀i. γ = 1 corresponds
to the case in which all the files can be cached in the storage units, i.e., the quota of
all the SBSs qi = F , ∀i. Table 1 summarizes all the parameters that we used in our
simulations.
Table 1: Simulation parameters.
Parameter Values Description
D 2000 time window
M 6 number of SBSs
K 6 number of CPSs
N 16 number of UEs
Bmax 20 total capacity of backhaul links (Mbit)
Wmax 150 total capacity of wireless links (Mbit)
F 128 number of files
li, ∀i 256 length of files (Mbit)
bij , ∀i, j 5 backhaul link capacities (Mbit)
The simulations using both of the algorithms were repeated 50 times and averaged.
The impact of the two algorithms on the backhaul usage was analyzed depending on
the total number of requests R in the network. The obtained numerical results for the
simulations of the matching-based algorithm and random caching are shown in Figure 3
and Figure 4, respectively.
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Figure 3: The backhaul usage using Iterative Deferred Acceptance Algorithm.


























Figure 4: The backhaul usage using Random Caching Algorithm.
In both of the Figures, we notice that when there is no storage space to cache the
files (γ = 0), the backhaul link usage is higher than the other configurations. Oppositely,
when the storage units have the capacity to store all the files (γ = 1), the backhaul usage
equals 0. However, we can see the difference between the two approaches for the other
values of γ (γ ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 0.75}). In fact, we notice that the caching algorithm based
on the deferred acceptance algorithm reduce the backhaul usage by 10-15 %
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6 Conclusion
In this thesis, we mainly addressed the backhaul issue in SCNs. We started our work by
presenting an overview on SCNs, the architecture of these networks, their advantages,
and their limitations. Then, we discussed the novel promising works that deal with the
backhaul issue through caching strategies. We noticed that most of these works are based
on classical optimization tools that mostly do not find the optimal solutions or often the
proposed algorithms have a high complexity and could not be applied in real systems. In
the second chapter, we explored game theory that provides mathematical tools to model
hard problems and find practical solutions. In particular, we introduced matching theory
and presented the main results in economic literature. Finally, we formulated the storage
problem in SCNs as an iterative one-to-one matching and provided an extension of the
deferred acceptance algorithm and showed that it always provide a stable and optimal
matching game between files owned by content providers and SBSs. The experimental
results show that the proposed algorithm can reduce the backhaul load by up to 15 %
compared to a random caching policy.
From a scientific point of view, this internship allowed me to have a strong intro-
duction to game theory an to start working on a paper under the title ”Many-to-Many
Matching Games for Proactive caching in Small Cell Networks”. In that paper we ex-
ploit novel, under-explored information, extracted from practical network dimensions
such as smartphones, social networks, or geo-location information so as to proactively
cache data. We modeled a caching problem as a many-to-many matching which is very
new approach and still not well understood. To our knowledge only two works in liter-
ature have exploited this class for resource allocation in wireless networks. For sack of
time we could not finish and present that work.
From a future Ph.D student point of view, this internship has been very rich. First,
it enabled me to acquire knowledge on game theory in general and matching theory in
particular, which is one of the aspect of my Ph.D subject: game theory applied to the
wireless networks. Secondly, it was a good opportunity to interact and work with the
dynamic team members of the Alcatel Lucent Chair on flexible Radio. I would like to
thank especially, my internship director Prof. Me´rouane Debbah and Dr. Walid Saad,
for offering me this opportunity and accepting to advise me.
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